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Abstract 
Privatisation has featured as a major part of the Government's 
SUPPlY side reforms since 1979. This article critically 
reviews the policy and its achievements. 
Introduction 
Just as the 1940s is remembered as the era of nationalisation, 
the 1980s will be remembered as the decade of privatisation. 
It therefore seems timely to review the achievements of the 
privatisation programme. The programme has had two main 
strands: (1) the sale of state assets (denationalisation), and 
(2) the introduction of competition into areas previously 
monopolised by state owned suppliers (liberalisation). It is, 
however, the former programme which has captured the most 
attention and which is the primary focus of this paper. 
Table 1 lists all of the major privatisations to date and 
Table 2 the amounts raised from each sale; in total the 
Government has sold almost f40 bn of state assets. In 1979 the 
state had a major stake in many of the UK's most important 
industries, namely steel, motor vehicles, aero engines, 
aerospace, coal, rail, road haulage, air travel, oil, 
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water. By i99i, 
however, only the coal industry and the railways remain in the 
state sector. 
(Tables 1 & 2 around here.) 
Three broad reasons have been put forward in support of 
privatisation: (1) it raises efficiency in sleepy state 
monopolies; (2) it widens share ownership with important gains 
in terms of raising public sympathy for private enterprise and 
profit making; and (3) it provides useful funds to augment the 
Exchequer's coffers at a time when macroeconomic policy 
dictates a reduction in the PSBR. 
In this paper each of the above rationale is critically 
assessed in the light of a decade's experience. An attempt is 
made to answer the question, to what extent has privatisation 
achieved its objectives? However, since the first rationale, 
the efficiency argument, is the most contentious, the paper 
concentrates upon the theoretical grounds for expecting 
privatisation to improve performance and the available data on 
actual performance changes. 
The Efficiency Argument 
The economic argument against state ownership in the 1970s 
came from the "new right" and drew on the public choice and 
property rights theories. Both theories are rooted in 
neoclassical economics and the concept of the rational utility 
maximiser and are worth reviewing in some detail. 
According to public choice theory, boards of state industries, 
civil servants in sponsoring departments and politicians in 
government and Parliament are no different to other people. 
Whereas earlier in the century Weber had popularised the 
notion of disinterested state officials pursuing the "public 
interest", public choice theory argued that government 
employees are strongly motivated by their own self-interest. 
According to one of its leading exponents, Niskanen (1971), - 
this translates into the pursuit of '@...salary, perquisites of 
the office, public regulation, power, patronage, output of the 
bureau, ease of making changes, and ease in managing the 
bureau". For politicians it means attempting to maximise the 
chances of remaining in office by shaping policies to gain 
votes justifying any kind of policy as being in the "public 
interest", even one which resultes in considerable burdens on 
tax payers. 
In this atmosphere, public choice economists considered it 
inevitable that the management of state industries would 
become demoralised in the face of shifting and inconsistent 
objectives and that the industries would fall under the 
influence of pressure groups, notably rent seeking trades 
unions. Consequently, the industries would suffer both over- 
manning and wasteful investment. This pessimistic view of 
public ownership seemed to be born out in the UK. In the 1970s 
productivity growth in the nationalised sector lagged well 
behind growth in the private sector and profits net of state 
subsidies were negative (Pryke, 1981). 
Property rights theory complemented the public choice 
critique. This argued that the source of the differing levels 
of efficiency in the public and private sectors lay in the 
capital market. State industries raised external funding 
through government, by loans with state guarantees, or 
directly from tax payers. The public, which in principle 
tlowns'l the state assets, has no formal property rights in the 
industries. They do not own tradeable shares or have rights to 
attend annual general meetings of the firms to, censure 
management. By contrast, in the private sector AGMs are held 
and shares are traded. Owners of shares are free to buy and 
sell them - buying further shares in companies which are well- 
run, hence raising the share price, and selling them in firms 
considered to be failing, thus deflating the share price and 
leaving the company exposed to a hostile takeover bid. 
Ultimately, according to property rights theorists, it is the 
vulnerability of companies to takeover by new management which 
is the vital spur to managerial efficiency in private 
enterprises and this is missing in the public sector. 
Inefficient nationalised industries are immune to take over. 
From a property rights perspective, the attenuation of 
property rights in the public sector inevitably leads to lower 
efficiency. No matter the good intentions of civil servants 
and politicians, the agent-principal relationship in the 
public sector leads to a waste of resources. 
In sum, the idea in the early.'1980s that privatisation would 
improve operating efficiency was based on removing political 
control and making firms rely on the private capital market. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1 by a movement from west to 
east, i.e. away from direct political control towards reliance 
on the private capital market. 
(Figure 1 around here.) 
.The public choice and property rights literature was 
popularised in the UX by the Institute of Economic Affairs and 
the Adam Smith Institute. It undoubtedly had a major influence 
on thinking about the public and private sectors in the 1970s 
and early 198Os, notably in the Conservative Party. However, 
it is not free from problems. In particular, studies of the 
operation of private capital markets have not demonstrated 
conclusively that a more active market in shares with an 
openness to hostile take over bids is economically beneficial. 
There is some suggestion that it might lead to an over- 
emphasis on short-term profits over long-term investment, thus 
lowering economic well-being. The economies of Japan and 
Germany with capital markets in which hostile bids are rare 
have performed much better since the War than the UX and the 
USA .where such bids are more common place. Of course, the 
capital market may not be a reason for this, but at least 
their experience demonstrates that an open capital market is 
not necessarv for high efficiency. 
It is also difficult to square the notion of the takeover 
threat as the key motivator for managerial efficiency, with 
the Government's retention of a ttgolden share" in a number of 
privatised firms. The golden share was introduced precisely to 
prevent unwelcome (especially foreign) takeovers of companies 
considered to be of strategic importance, eg. British 
Aerospace and Rolls Royce. The removal of the golden share 
which led to Ford's takeover of Jaguar may be seen as a 
belated recognition of the contradiction in government 
thinking about the desirability of takeovers. 
Turning to motivation in the public sector, which lies at the 
heart of the public choice literature, detailed studies of the 
working of government suggest that the idea of self-interested 
individuals is a crude caricature. For example, the civil 
service went about cutting its own manning levels in the 1980s 
with an enthusiasm which is hard to square with the idea of 
"looking after number one" (Dunsire and Hood, 1989) 
The economic case for believing that privatisation will 
necessarily raise efficiency is therefore not clear cut. 
Indeed, some economists have argued that increasing 
competition in the product market is a more reliable way of 
creating an environment in which management has the necessary 
incentives to operate enterprises efficiently (Millward and 
Parker, 1983; Kay and Thompson, 1986). The role of competition 
in allocative efficiency is, of course, central to the 
neoclassical models of perfect competition and monopoly. Also, 
Leibenstein (1966) has emphasised the link between product 
market competition and ttx-efficiencytt. 
The allocative and x-efficiency gains from increasing 
competition are illustrated in Figure 1 by a movement from 
north to south, i.e. from monopoly towards more competitive 
markets. By combining the capital market and competition 
arguments, and accepting the notion that private capital 
markets are beneficial for economic performance, it appears 
that the largest efficiency gains can be expected where there 
is an ownership change which leads to both more competition 
Q 
and more reliance on private capital markets - a movement from 
north-west to south-east in Figure 1. 
The actual movement of a number of privatised firms has been 
plotted in the Figure. It .can be seen that very few 
privatisations have been associated with a significant 
movement from north to south - in other word, with an increase 
in competition. Firms such as National Freight (NFC), which 
while in the state sector always had less than 10 per cent of 
the UK haulage market, have continued to compete as before. 
The same applies to Jaguar cars. State monopolies, in 
particular the water industry, are no more open to competition 
now than before privatisation. BT faces competition from 
Mercury Communications and in the future from cable and PCNs, 
but in 1991, seven years after privatisation, still retains 
95% of the UK telecommunications market. British Gas remains 
the monopoly supplier of domestic gas, though, following a 
Monopolies Commission report in 1988, it is being forced to 
permit increased competition in the industrial market. At the 
present time, even electricity generation offers only a 
promise of more competition. Also, there is a case where 
competition has actually declined (a south to north move). 
British Airways strengthened its market power, in an industry 
where competition is already highly regulated, when it was 
allowed to takeover a major rival within the UK, British 
Caledonian. 
Given the earlier reservation about the role of the capital 
market in ensuring efficiency, the fact that the opportunity 
was not taken to inject more competition into state firms at 
the time of privatisation must remain a source of regret. 
Also, it is worth recalling that privatisation. was not a 
necessary step in increasing competition. The legislation 
which created Mercury as a rival to BT, liberalised coach and 
later bus services, and enabled any energy supplier to utilise 
the gas and electricity distribution systems, preceded 
privatisation of the relevant industries. 
Share Ownership 
Reversing the decline in individual share ownership has been a 
goal of recent Conservative Governments. Since the War, the 
proportion of shares held by the large institutional investors 
has grown at the expense of individual share ownership. By 
giving priority to the small shareholder when selling state 
assets, the proportion of adults owning shares has trebled 
from around 7 to 25 per cent since 1979. Small shareholders 
have been enticed through expensive advertising campaigns of 
the '@Tell Sid" variety, and by the offer of bonus shares or 
vouchers against their telephone and gas bills. 
There are obvious political gains for the Conservatives in 
fostering a "property owning democracy@@, but ministers from 
time to time have also hinted at a possible economic dividend. 
It has been suggested that private shareholders will be more 
supportive of the goals of capitalism. Also, where employees 
of privatised firms hold shares, and employees have been given 
preference in share flotations, it has been argued that they 
now have a direct interest in the financial health of their 
companies. The implication is that they will work harder and 
strike less. 
When governments attempt to pursue more than one economic 
objective using only one policy instrument, contradictions can 
arise. This has been true of privatisation. There appears to 
be a contradiction between creating large numbers of small 
shareholders and the argument that the capital market is 
important in producing more efficient industries following 
privatisation. The mechanism in the property rights literature 
by which the capital market promotes efficient operation is 
arguably more consistent with a capital market dominated by a 
few large shareholders rather than many small investors. This 
follows because it is rational for a person who has only a 
small stake in an enterprise to invest little time and effort 
in monitoring its performance. The costs of continuous 
monitoring and consequent share dealing will far outweigh the 
benefits. Rather, detailed scrutiny of industries and 
managements is an economic proposition for the large 
institutional investors who have a lot more funds at stake in 
a firm. Similarly, because of transactions costs, notably 
brokers charges, small shareholders are less likely to trade 
actively in the shares, thus it is the large investors who are 
the ones to be courted during a takeover bid. 
It is also easy to exaggerate the impact of privatisation 
flotations on the composition of share ownership in Britain. 
The Government likes to emphasise the rise in the proportion 
of adults holding shares since 1979, but 54% of investors hold 
shares in only one company and only 17% have shares in more 
than four enterprises (HM Treasury, 1991). Privatisation has 
widened share ownership but it has not deeoened 
reversed the relentless growth in the financial 
City institutions. During the 1980s the 
investors continued to raise their proportion of 
at the expense of the private investor, whose 
it, nor as it 
power of the 
institutional 
shareholdings 
share of the 
market fell from 30% to 20%. However, insofar as the capital 
market is an important constraint on management behaviour in 
the private sector, this may be a desirable development. 
Raising Funds 
Just as there is an. apparent conflict between the policy 
objective of promoting shareholding and that of promoting 
efficiency, there is also a conflict with the goal of raising 
funds for the Exchequer. If the priority had been to spread 
wealth through maximising the number of small shareholders, 
the shares could simply have been given away. Instead, the 
shares have been sold though usually at far less than their 
opening market value on the first day of trading (see Figure 
2) l This has raised funds for the Exchequer but at the cost of 
reducing the potential spread of share ownership. It has also 
provided windfall capital gains to ttstagstt at a cost to tax 
payers in general (as Figure 2 illustrates, the Government's 
10 
ability to set a flotation price close to the true market 
valuation does not appear to be improving with experience). 
(Figure 2 around here.) 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of privatisation revenues on 
the PSBR since 1980. The revenues are treated as negative 
public spending under UK public sector accounting convention 
and thus reduce the size of the government's financial 
deficit. Although much play has been made of the way 
privatisation receipts have improved the look of the public 
finances, in fact only in one year, 1987-88, did they turn a 
positive PSBR into a debt repayment. At best, privatisation 
receipts have provided a useful but small supplement to 
taxation. Suggestion that the privatisation receipts have 
ltmassagedtt government finances in some dramatic way cannot be 
supported. In terms of the share of public spending in GDP, 
they reduced the percentage by 1.5 points in 1988-89, but in 
other years by less. 
(Figure 3 aound here.) 
Assessing the Efficiency Argument: some empirical results and 
the problem of regulation 
We saw earlier that privatisation is most likely to raise the 
operating efficiency of the enterprises concerned when it is 
coupled with more competition in the product market. We now 
turn to consider the evidence to date on the impact of 
privatisation on efficiency. This is approached by looking at 
some of the available economic and financial data relating to 
privatised companies and by reviewing research recently 
undertaken at the University of York into the effects in terms 
of Figure 1 of west to east shifts in ownership. The 
discussion concludes by considering some of the issues for 
efficiency raised by the need for on-going regulation of 
natural monopolies. 
Privatisation: the results so far 
Since most privatisations occurred after 1983, it is still too 
early to make conclusive judgments on the impact of ownership 
change on many of the companies concerned. What we can say is 
that the. experience of privatised firms to date is mixed. A 
recent study of Britain's most profitable companies in terms 
of profits per employee in 1990, placed 4 former nationalised 
industries in the top 20. The star performers were the British 
Airports Authority in 8th position, followed by 5 water 
companies, British Steel and BT. (Manaaement Today, May 1991, 
p.55). However, profitability is generally considered on its 
own to be an inadequate indicator of gains in economic 
efficiency, and the level in one year tells us nothing about 
trends in the enterprise resulting from privatisation. Perhaps 
these enterprises would have been just as profitable had they 
remained in the state sector. 
Table 3 gives a series of financial performance indicators for 
a selection of companies since their privatisation. It is 
apparent from the figures that, while top manager salaries 
have risen impressively, improved performance has not always 
resulted. The return on capital has improved marginally in the 
case of British Gas, BT and Rolls Royce but has declined badly 
at Associated British Ports, Enterprise Oil and Jaguar cars 
(the latter two firms were affected by adverse demand 
movements). Sales per employee (a crude productivity 
indicator) improved most at Associated British Ports but not 
dramatically in the other firms, and it actually declined at 
Rolls Royce and Enterprise Oil. The idea that privatisation 
leads to a shake-out of labour as wasteful working practices 
are terminated receives some support in the cases of British 
Gas and Associated British Ports, where employment declined, 
but elsewhere employment rose (though since 1989 BT has also 
begun a major programme of redundancies). Of course, many of 
the improvements in performance may have occurred before 
privatisation, but this raises the question, was privatisation 
really necessary? Interestingly, nationalised industries 
raised their profitability as a percentage of GDP and also 
increased their productivity faster than the private sector in 
the 1980s (Table 4). Bishop and Kay in 1988 concluded that the 
growth in total factor productivity between 1979 and 1988 in 
the privatised firms they studied appeared ttwholly unrelated 
to privatizationtt. After also studying accounting data similar 
to that reproduced in Table 3, they observed: 
'#The overall picture to emerge . . . . . is one of 
substantial change. output and profits have grown, 
margins have increased, employment has declined. But the 
relationship of these changes to the fact of 
privatization is not immediately apparent from the data. 
The privatized industries have tended to be faster 
growing and more profitable, but it seems that the 
causation runs from growth and profitability to 
privatization, rather than the other way round.** (pp.40- 
41) 
(Tables 3 and 4 around here.) 
The York research oroiect 
The research undertaken at the University of York between 1986 
and 1990, in which the author of this paper was involved, 
consisted of a study of the effects of ownership on economic 
and financial performance.' The organisations studied had 
either crossed the public-private boundary (privatisation or 
nationalisation) or had undergone major changes of status 
within the public sector. These changes of status involved the 
introduction of more commercial management and financial 
independence, and a reduction in direct political involvement 
in day-to-day operations. The organisations studied and their 
changes in ownership status are summarised in Figure 4. Only 
two of the Thatcher privatisations, British Aerospace and the 
National Freight Corporation, were included; but since all of 
the other cases test for the effects of a Figure 1 west to 
east movement, the results have general relevance to a 
discussion of privatisation. 
(Figure 4 around here.) 
Performance was measured three ways: (1) in terms of 
employment efficiency using an established employment 
function, (2) in terms of labour and total factor productivity 
and (3) through an analysis of a basket of standard accounting 
ratios. The productivity results were compared with national 
trends to ensure that the changes observed were not simply the 
product of productivity trends in the macro economy. 
Table 5 summarises the results of the study. The hypothesis 
that a movement away from political control improves 
performance was generally supported in six out of the ten 
organisations studied - the Royal Mint, HMSO, London Transport 
(1984 change), National Freight, British Airways and the 
privatisation of British Aerospace. This includes both of the 
ltprivatisationtt cases. However, the results for Rolls Royce 
consistently contradicted the hypothesis, performance improved 
following nationalisation, and performance failed to improve 
as expected in 'the cases of the postal and telecommunication 
services and the Royal Ordnance Factories. 
(Table 5 around here.) 
What the results imply is that a Figure 1 west to east shift 
may improve performance, but that this improvement is not 
guaranteed. Performance improvement may depend upon other 
factors than ownership. Simple propositions about ownership 
and performance need to be qualified and treated with some 
caution. This implies that future research needs to focus on 
other sources of efficiency which may or may not be associated 
with changes in ownership - namely, greater competition in the 
product market, improvements in management, and changes in 
employment contracts which encourage improved performance. 
The Problem of Reaulation 
The .conclusion that economic performance depends upon many 
factors, of which ownership status may only be one, is 
supported by international studies of the relative efficiency 
of public and private enterprises. Studies of publicly and 
privately owned firms operating in the same or similar markets 
have not demonstrated that private firms are always more 
efficient, especially in terms of costs of production and 
productivity, though they usually record higher profits (for 
reviews of the evidence see e.g. Borcherding, Pommerhene and 
Schneider, 1982; Millward and Parker, 1983). What these 
studies do suggest is that competition in the product market 
is often a key variable, with the efficiency of both publicly 
owned and privately owned firms enhanced by rivalry. A 
conclusion which accords with our earlier discussion of the 
relevant economic theory. Where competition is precluded by 
natural monopoly factors, most especially in the electricity, 
gas and water industries, there are reported cases of lower 
cost production in the public sector. 
A likely explanation of this result lies in the need to 
regulate private suppliers. In other words, the choice is not 
between dynamic and competitive private firms and sleepy state 
monopolies, but between private monopoly or state monopoly. In 
both cases, to protect consumers from monopoly exploitation 
some form of government regulation must exist. Under public 
ownership this is hidden within.the bureaucratic mechanism and 
is likely to be flexible and reactive to political as well as 
economic pressures. Privatisation pushes regulation into the 
open and makes it more visible and structured. 
In the UK the privatised monopolies are now regulated by terms 
laid down in their privatisation legislation and their 
operating licences. For example, BT, which was the first 
public utility to be privatised, has an operating license 
which runs for 25 years in the first instance, and which sets 
out the terms under which the utility must operate, including 
the supply of rural services, call boxes and 999 emergency 
calls. Prices are largely regulated by formula and the 
regulatory system is policed by the Office .of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL). This structure has been copied for 
gas, water and electricity. 
The impact of a regulatory system depends upon its influence 
on managerial behaviour. In the USA, where private monopoly 
suppliers of electricity, gas and water have existed for many 
years, the regulatory system has led to confusion, litigation 
and commercial disaster. The regulations control, inter alia, 
the level of service, environmental considerations and 
pricing, much as in the UK. 
Three broad problems have been experienced in the US. Firstly, 
the quasi-judicial system has given too many opportunities to 
lobbyists and lawyers. Consequently, resources are used up in 
lengthy rent seeking operations. Secondly, the regulatory 
agencies in the US have been criticised for siding with the 
supplier against the consumer. Although to date the UK 
regulatory bodies have shown commendable independence, the 
American experience suggests that "regulatory capturetl is an 
ever present threat where private regulated monopolies exist 
(Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). Thirdly, prices have 
generally been regulated with a view to achieving or 
preserving a "satisfactory" rate of return on capital. But 
where a ceiling on the rate of return on capital exists, the 
incentive for management to control costs is reduced and an 
incentive exists to extend the capital base through more 
investment - the so-called Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and 
Johnson, 1962). 
The method of price control introduced in the UK when BT was 
privatised, and subsequently extended to the other privatised 
monopolies, is summarised in Figure 5. It was designed to 
overcome the distortionary effects of US style regulation. The 
"RPI minus X1' formula was intended to control prices while 
permitting increased profits resulting from lower costs. 
However, despite its advantages over direct rate of return 
control, it does contain a major flaw which can lead to 
precisely the same inefficiencies as US style regulation. 
(Figure 5 around here.) 
The flaw lies in the "Xl* factor. For example, initally BT 
could raise its tariffs by the RPI less 3%, therefore when 
inflation was 7% the charges covered by the formula could rise 
by up to 4%. This was designed to leave an incentive for 
management to reduce costs by more than 3% thereby boosting 
profits to shareholders. However, this will only work if cost 
savings are not clawed back when the pricing formula is 
reviewed. In other words, if OFTEL decides that profits are 
tNtoo high" following a BT efficiency drive, and the "Xl' factor 
is therefore increased - consumers benefit but shareholders 
lose out. Thus shareholders can gain only from the time of the 
efficiency improvement to the time when the price formula is 
renewed - at most, five years. 
In practice, it appears that the 'IX** factor is indeed being 
set at renewal with a view to what the regulatory body 
considers to be a "satisfactory@' rate of profit. In the face 
of increasing profits, BT's IrXtl was raised to 4.5% in 1989 and 
to 6.25% in 1991. James McKinnon, Director General of OFGAS, 
has made it known that he considers that gas prices should be 
set to earn a rate of return of around 5 to 7% on regulated 
gas supplies. In May 1991 the Office of Water Supplies (OFWAT) 
expressed concern about the growth of profits in the water 
industry, which is ahead of estimates made at the time of 
privatisation. 
Profits gained through monopoly exploitation are unacceptable. 
But threatening noises made about the growth of profits by the 
'regulator, especially when accompanied by an up-grading of the 
*@X** factor, destroy managerial incentives to reduce costs and 
become more efficient. Also, insofar as investors take account 
of the risk of a change .in the **X** factor, this raises the 
firm's cost of capital. Moreover, the regulatory bodies have 
to prevent the monopolies increasing profits by raising prices 
unduly in services not covered by the pricing formula or by 
lowering the quality of the service. Recently, OfGAS informed 
British Gas that if it discovered that the quality of service 
was being sacrificed, the **X** factor might be raised as a 
penalty. The use of the **X** factor in this way, however, risks 
a further blurring of its purpose. 
Therefore, the "RPI minus Xl* formula has not overcome the 
distortionary effects on resource allocation associated with 
American style regulation. Also, there is no sign of new 
competition in the forseeable future removing the need for 
pricing and service regulation. Indeed, quite the reverse. 
Since privatisation, OFTEL has been drawn into regulating 
international calls and interconnection charges, and OFGAS 
into monitoring industrial gas pricing, precisely to 
facilitate new entry. 
Conclusions , 
The UK in the 1980s was subjected to a privatisation 
experiment, now much copied around the world (Hemming and 
Mansoor, 1988). But like nationalisation, privatisation has 
been surrounded by more rhetoric than objective research. Only 
now are economists able to begin to analyse its theoretical 
rationale alongside its actual effects. Two possible 
conclusions suggest themselves: 
(1) privatisation is sound in principle but the policy could 
have been better executed - the attempt to pursue three broad 
goals: increasing efficiency, widening share ownership and 
reducing the PSBR led to inevitable conflicts in policy; 
(2) privatisation is defective in principle, there are no 
sound theoretical or empirical underpinnings for a policy of 
transferring large chunks of the public sector to private 
enterprise. . 
At 'present it is not possible to be sure which of these 
conclusions is correct. The theoretical case for privatisation 
relies upon a particularly pessimistic view of motivation in 
the public sector, alongside what some would consider an 
overly optimistic view of the disciplining effect on 
management of exposure to the private capital market. At the 
same time, the available empirical evidence on the effects of 
privatisation on operating efficiency is ambiguous. Some 
organisations have registered improved performance after 
privatisation, while others seem to have recorded *large 
efficiency gains while in the public sector. 
Economic theory and the international evidence suggest that 
competition is a key factor in ensuring high operating 
efficiency, and this is also borne out by the UK's experience 
of competitive tendering for goverment services during the 
198Os, where cost savings of around 20% or more were recorded 
(Parker, .1990). Belatedly the Government has recognised this. 
During .the privatisation of the electricity industry some 
competition was injected into electricity generation and since 
1989 10% of gas from new North Sea fields has been sold 
through other suppliers than British Gas. Also, in March 1991 
the government announced an end to the duopoly in 
telecommunications, permitting new applications to run trunk 
networks. 
In at least the immediate future, however, the privatised 
public utilities will remain dominant in their industries. 
After 7 years of competition from Mercury Communications, BT 
still controls 95% of the UK telecommunications market; while 
the private sector's share of gas and electricity supplies is 
limited to a small amount of the industrial market. In much of 
the water industry it is difficult to see how competition can 
develop. 
The existence of privatised monopolies has necessitated the 
creation of a regulatory structure for each industry. Hence, 
privatisation has altered the form of regulation - from 
political direction to arm's length control by the means of 
legislation, operating licenses and regulatory bodies. Given 
the pivotal role of the telecommunications, gas, electricity 
and water industries in the economy, it is difficult to see 
how any government could have abdicated responsibility for 
their behaviour. But while privatisation has removed the 
inefficiences resulting from direct political intervention, it 
has introduced distortions, notably in terms of price control. 
Moreover, based on the American example, there remains an ever 
present threat of regulatory capture and regulatory muddle 
(the regulatory structure of the water industry appears to 
have been designed to maximise the chances of confusion - the 
industry is now subject to the scrutiny of not only OFWAT, but 
H.M. Inspectorate of Pollution, the Department of the 
Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, the European Commission and the National 
Rivers Authority!). 
Consequently,. the 1990s is likely to see heated debate about 
the form and extent of regulation and its impact on the way 
the firms behave. The UK has created the regulatory structure 
without much 'thought as to whether it is to be temporary or 
permanent or to its economic effects. This is particularly 
surprising given the evidence on regulatory failure in the US 
evidence available to government at the time of 
privatisation. If regulators get involved in questions of 
costs, prices, rates of return and service quality, they are 
almost managing the industries. W ith what consequences? 
Footnote 
1. The research was funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council as part of its Management in Government Initiative 
(Project no. E0925006). Other members of the research team 
included Professors Keith Hartley and Andrew Dunsire. 
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Questions for Discussion 
1. To what extent does the policy of privatisation have firm 
roots in economic theory? 
2. Why did the Government consider it important to widen share 
ownership through privatisation ? Was this economically 
sensible? 
3. To what extent does the Government's retention of a **golden 
share** inhibit the mechanism by which the capital market is 
supposed to raise efficiency? 
4. Given that it does not appear from the evidence that 
privatising enterprises guarantees efficiency gains, how might 
coal and rail be best privatised? 
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PRIVATISATION NEW ISSUES: 
PREMIUM AFTER FIRST DAY’S TRADING 
100 
80 
60 : 
% 
- 
m 
1. 
2: 
s 
2 
(P 
z 
3 
- 
- 
m 1. 2: 
s 
B -. 
i 
s Q 
- - 
- 
z = 0 I 
z Y si 
- 
iii- 
T 
2 Z 
P 
< 
0 
cc c 
5 
s 
6 3 
F d 
b; cc1 
Z - 
5 
m 
B 
% 
1 
0 
G 
.I G, 5 % c z 
m 
u3 F 
3 
-. 
1. Z!I 
z 
2: VI s 
v, r 1. 
L 
r v, 
G) 
: 
5 
: 
0 -. 
1984 1987 1987 1990 1987 1989 1991 1986 1989 1984 
Figure 3 
PRIVATISATION : IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR BORROWING REQUIREMENT 
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Source: H.M. Treasury, 1991, Financial Statement and Budget Report 1991 - 1992, 
HMSO, London, p.67 
THE ORGANISATIONS 
Tvpe of change Organisation 
Date 
of change 
I Movements within the public sector 
(a) Government department to Royal Ordnance Factories July 1974 
tradingfund Royal Mint April 1975 
HMSO April 1980 
_ 
(b)~&vernment department to Post Office Postal April 1969 . . . . . l..Ipublic corporation Post Office Telecommunications April 1969 
(c) Public cokporation 
accountable to local government London Transport Janu;rry 1970 
(d) Local government accountability 
to normal public corporation London Transport June 1984 StatUS 
U: Ownership chanse 
(a) Private to public 
(b) Public to private 
(privatisation) 
(c) Anticipating privatisation 
Rolls Royce February 1971 
British Aerospace April 1977 
British Aerospace February 1981 
National Freight February 1982 
British Airways 1980-1987 
Figure 5 
UK PRIVATISED MONOPOLIES: PRICE REGULATION 
Organisation 
British Telecom 
(B-0 
British Gas 
British Airports 
Authority (BAA) 
Water 
Electricity 
Distribution 
Scottish Electricity 
Companies 
Main Feature of 
Price Regulation 
RPI-3% 1984-89 
RPI-4.5% 1989-91 
RPI-6.25% 1991- 
RPI-2% 1986-92 
RPI-5% 1992- 
Maximum annual 
revenue per passenger 
RPI + k 
RPI-X + y 
RPI-X 
Comment 
Initially applied to around 
one-half of turnover. Now 
extended to 80 per cent of 
turnover. 
Excludes input costs from North 
Sea which can be passed through 
to the consumer; applies to 
domestic market only. 
Duty free shops franchised. 
“k” varies for each company and 
reflects agreed future capital 
investment programmes, eg to 
improve water quality. Allowed to 
pass through costs of complying 
with new statutory obligations. 
Allowed to pass through certain 
generation costs (the “y” factor). 
The initial value of X has been set 
at zero for all the regional 
electricity companies. 
Generation, transmission and 
distribution have separate “X” 
factors. 
Table 1 
MAJOR UK PRIVATISATIONS 
Sales of government's 
holdings in 
British Petroleum 
National Enterprise Board 
investments 
British Aerospace 
Cable and Wireless 
Amersham International 
National Freight Corporation 
' Britoil 
British Rail Hotels 
Associated British Ports 
British Leyland (Rover) 
British Telecom (BT) 
Enterprise Oil 
Sealink 
British Shipbuilders and 
. naval dockyards 
National Bus Company 
British Gas 
Rolls Royce 
British Airports Authority 
British Airways 
Royal Ordnance Factories 
British Steel 
Water 
Electricity distribution 
Electricity generation 
various dates 
various dates 
Dates 
1979 to 1987 
1980 to 1986 
1981 & 1984 
1981, 1983 & 1985 
1982 
1982 
1982 & 1985 
1983 
1983 & 1984 
various dates 1984 to 1982 
1984 & 1991 
1984 
1984 
from 1985 
from 1986 
1986 
1987 
first issue 1987 
1987 
1987 
1988 & 1989 
1989 & 1990 
1990 
1991 
Note: 
* planned. 
Table 2 
PRIVATISATION PROCEEDS 
(fbn.) 
Year Proceeds 
1979180 0.4 
1980/81 0.2 
1981182 0.5 
1982/83 0.5 
1983184 1.1 
1984185 2.1 
1985186 ' 2.7 
1986187 4.5 
1987/88 5.1 
1988189 7.1 
1989/90 4.2 
1990/91 5.3 
1991192 5.5* 
Notes: 
* planned. 
Figures rounded to one decimal place. 
Sources: Cmnd. 1021 (1990); H.M. Treasury, Financial Statement 
and Budset Report, 1991-92, March 1991, HMSO, Table 5.1. 
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Table 4 
Year Gross Trading Surplus 
1979/80 1.1 0.5 
1980/81 1.5 0.6 
1981/82 2.1 0.8 
1982/83 2.7 1.0 
1983/84 2.7 0.9 
1984/85 3.1 0.9 
1985/86 3.9 1.1 
1986/87 4.5 1.2 
PERFORMANCE OF NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
fbn %GDP 
Labour Productivity 
(annual O/o change) 
Nationalised Whole Manufacturing 
Industries Economy 
0.1 0.7 0.9 
-0.5 -3.8 -5.3 
6.5 3.5 6.9 
2.4 4.0 6.4 
7.2 4.0 8.3 
6.0 2.9 4.8 
9.6 1.1 2.4 
6.2 3.6 4.8 
Source: Treasury, Economic Propress ReDort, No. 193, December 1987, p 5. 
SUMMARY OF THE YORK RESEARCH RESULTS 
Did Performance Improve as Expected? 
Organisation 
Royal Mint 
London Transport 
(1970 change) 
London Transport 
(1984 change) 
British Airways 
British Aerospace 
(nationalisation) 
British Aerospace 
(privatisation) 
National Freight 
Post Office Postal 
Post Office 
Telecommunications 
HMSO 
Royal Ordnance Factories 
Rolls Royce 
Notes: 
N/A = not available 
Performance Measure 
Employment Labour 
Function Productivity 
Confirmed Confirmed 
Not confirmed Not confirmed 
Mainly confirmed Confirmed 
Confirmed Confirmed 
Mainly confirmed Confirmed 
Confirmed Confirmed 
Confirmed Confirmed 
Not confirmed Confirmed 
Mainly confirmed Confirmed 
Confirmed Unclear 
Not confirmed Not confirmed 
Not confirmed Not confirmed 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Unclear 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Unclear 
Not confirmed 
Unclear 
Not confirmed 
Financial 
Ratios 
WA 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Unclear 
Confirmed 
Confirmed 
Not confirmed 
For financial ratios, “confirmed” applies to these cases where 40% or more of the results 
supported the central hypothesis. 
The research from which these results were derived was funded by the ESRC as part of its 
Management in Government Initiative (project number E09250006). 
For further details of the results see Parker and Hartley (1991), Hartley, Parker and Martin 
(1991) and Parker, Hartley and Martin, (1991). 
